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En général, les employeurs et les employés ont de la difficulté à
maintenir un niveau de paiement stable quand le paiement est à la pièce. En citant
des exemples de l’industrie du textile britannique du 19e siècle, cet article vise à
examiner les différentes approches que les acteurs ont utilisées afin de garder le
niveau de paiement. Les stratégies adoptées ont dépendu des réponses
émotionnelles des travailleurs et surtout de leurs relations avec leurs homologues
et leurs patrons. Suivant le modèle de Lazear (1995), je suggère que les sanctions
externes étaient privilégiées dans une culture de honte où les travailleurs étaient
indifférents à l’égard du bien-être de leurs homologues et de celui de leurs patrons.
Dans ces cultures, les acteurs ont utilisé les listes pour protéger la méthode de
paiement. Là où les travailleurs ont valorisé davantage leurs relations avec leurs
homologues,c’est-à-dire une culture de culpabilité, les sanctions internes étaient
utilisées. Dans cette culture, un système de partage des profits était établi afin de
garder la méthode de paiement.
The ratchet effect undermines firms’ ability to pay workers a steady
piece rate. Using examples from the nineteenth-century British textile industry, this
paper studies the different strategies firms and workers used to enforce piece rates.
The strategies depended upon the emotional responses of workers, especially their
relationship with their co-workers and with their employers. Following Lazear
(1995), I argue that external or shame-based sanctions were prevalent in
communities where workers showed indifference between the welfare of their co-
workers and that of their bosses. In these cases, blacklists enforced the piece rate.
Where workers felt more guilt about the welfare of their coworkers, internal
sanctions were common. In guilt cultures, profit-sharing schemes enforced the
established piece rate.
Mots Clés : Méthodes de paiement, paiement à la pièce, partage des profits,
histoire économique britannique
Keywords : Methods of pay, piece rates, profit-sharing, British economic
history
1Introduction
In his Presidential address to the Economic History Association, Peter Temin
(1997) asked whether it was "kosher" to talk about culture.  In this study of the
ratchet effect I pose whether it is also ’korrekt’ to talk about Freud.  The
ratchet effect refers to competitive pressures to cut piece rates, even after they
have been fixed at some norm or standard rate.  Containing these pressures
requires some means of enforcement (Kanemoto and MacLeod 1992).
Workers and firms, or some third party, can take it upon themselves to enforce
the norm and punish rate busters; or the norm can be self-enforced without
redress to external sanctions.  The choice of enforcement will depend on the
emotional responses of workers:  how they perceive and adjust to their
relationship with co-workers and their employers.  External sanctions are
prevalent where shame is the dominant emotion.  Internal sanctions or self-
enforcement are most common in guilt cultures.
The varieties of pay methods and regional specialization in the Lancashire
cotton-textile industry of the mid to late nineteenth century provide the
background to this paper’s study of enforcement mechanisms.  In particular, I
examine the Bolton (fine spinning) and Oldham (coarse spinning) payment
schemes.  At mid century, payment by the piece was the universal form of
remuneration in Lancashire.  In the 1870s, however, Oldham employers
attached a profit-sharing scheme to piece-rate pay.  Enforcement in this case
was by internal or guilt-based sanctions.  Workers performed to their best
abilities - they did not free ride or shirk - because they had a strong internal
desire not to let their co-workers down.  Compared to a basic piece-rate
scheme, profit sharing had the effect of raising productivity and stabilising
employment.  Bolton, in contrast, lacked the emotional bent necessary to
transform its system.  Workers in the town were indifferent between the well-
being of their co-workers and their bosses. Under these conditions, as Lazear
(1995) has shown, there are no gains to profit sharing because the free-rider
problem will persist.  In Bolton, workers continued to be paid by a strict piece
rate and external sanctions that aroused shame emotions contained the ratchet
effect.
How did these two enforcement systems arise?  What was the relation between
the two systems and technical change, wage growth and profits?  If profit
sharing was superior, as is commonly supposed, how did the two systems
coexist?  As Farnie (1982, 50) has written, "the rapid rise of Oldham provides
a sharp contrast to the economic history of Bolton, which grew relatively
slowly and like a tree rather than a mushroom." Britain’s comparative
advantage actually lay in fine spinning and Oldham’s rise is therefore all the
more surprising in the face of stiff competition from low-wage countries in its
2overseas markets for coarse yarn and goods.  Was Lancashire’s decline a result
of too much guilt and not enough shame?
The Ratchet Effect in Lancashire
Business and economic historians, sociologists and other students of industrial
relations have documented numerous episodes of piece-rate remuneration
where it was in the interest of both workers and firms to fix rates at some norm
or standard level.1  This solution stems from the commitment of workers not to
engage in restriction of output campaigns, and from the commitment of firms
to abstain from rate cutting at the first sign of falling revenues.  Thus, Daniel
Nelson in his study of industrial relations in late nineteenth-century US found
that firms urged one another to exercise self-restraint in cutting piece rates, so
that workers would have no reason to engage in quota restriction.  "Employers
who gave the situation serious thought soon came to the conclusion that the
solution lay in two areas: more care in rate fixing and guarantee against rate
cutting (Nelson 1975, 45)."
The establishment of piece rate lists in Lancashire would appear to be
consistent with this trend.  During the early factory period in Lancashire
episodes of rate cutting by employers were common.2  In order to show
employers that they would or could not work at the lower rates, because of the
extra effort required or because of the lower earnings it would entail, workers
often resorted strategically to formal campaigns of stopping production
(strikes) or informal means, like restricting output or goldbricking.  These
campaigns were costly to all parties - workers lost earnings, firms lost output.
By the second generation of factory work both parties recognized that it was in
their joint interest to set rates in fixed lists.  These lists stipulated how much
workers were to be paid for spinning different counts of yarn on different
lengths of spinning machines (mules).  The payment scheme was rigid in the
sense that, although cyclical adjustments were made of normally five percent
below or above the published standard list depending on the state of the
industry, the structure or makeup of the lists was not altered.
The lists first appeared in fine spinning because the sector had been in the
forefront of the industry’s development since the late eighteenth century.3  An
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  For early studies, see Mathewson (1969) and Roy (1952).  These case studies and others are
reviewed in Miller (1992).
2
  For accounts of industrial relations until 1850 see, Cohen (1990), Huberman (1996) and
Lazonick (1990).
3
  The history of the lists is found in British Association (1887), Huberman (1995, 1996), and
Jewkes and Gray (1935).
3early example is the Bolton list of 1813 that stipulated prices paid per lb of
yarn.4  Earnings varied with the vintage of the machinery.  A spinner working
a newer mule would earn higher wages, but labour costs per lb of yarn spun
were the same on old and new machinery.  The Bolton list had no speed clause
which meant that if the machines went faster, workers’ earnings went up
proportionately.
Lists in coarse spinning developed much later.  The Oldham list actually dates
from 1872.  It calculated how much yarn could be normally spun on mules of
different speeds and lengths.  To set the piece rate, normal production on a
given mule was divided into the standard weekly wage, a time component
each spinner was ensured of.  Unlike Bolton’s, the Oldham list made for equal
earnings, but unequal labour costs per lb of yarn spun.  Later variants of the
Oldham list included a speed clause that split the gains in output between
firms and workers.  I will return to this adjustment below.
The early lists were often negotiated by informal groups of workers and
employers.  In fact, the lists seem to have predated permanent employers’
associations, but once organized employers recognized unions as the
legitimate bargaining agent of workers.  In other words, the lists encouraged
the ’modernization’ of industrial bargaining.  There were tensions, nonetheless.
Into the last quarter of the nineteenth century there were disputes over bad
spinning (the use of inferior raw cotton), the timing and extent of wage cuts
and over accusations that firms had reneged on agreements to restore wage
cuts.  Thus, collaboration was imperfect.
The structure of the lists themselves contributed to their instability.  The lists’
makeup implied that it was relatively cheaper to use the Bolton list to spin
certain counts of coarse yarn, and that it was less expensive to spin selected
fine-yarn counts using the Oldham list.  Given the proximity of towns in
Lancashire and the high mobility of capital, and the obvious benefits for some
individual firms and workers to break the district lists, it is remarkable that
they became dominant in the first place.  Evidently, some mills attempted to
take advantage of the price differentials.  Acknowledging these differentials,
Jewkes and Gray (1935, 103), the historians of the lists, wrote: "[T]he
observable differences have no real relation to technical conditions, but are the
outcome of chance, or the unforeseen offspring of some muddled industrial
struggle."  
The instability or fragility of the lists was the result of an inherent problem of
piece-rate remuneration: the transparent relation between earnings and output.
                                                
4
  The Bolton list became the model for other fine-spinning lists, such as the Manchester list of
1829.
4Consider a firm paying a linear piece rate that introduces a new technology
without any adjustment of rates.  Workers gain experience in the new
technology and their output and earnings rise.  However, cooperation between
workers and firms is shortlived because, in a competitive environment, new
technologies and skills spread from one firm to another.  Other firms,
sometimes started by former employees of the first, can always undercut (or
ratchet down) the innovating firm by starting up a new operation, teaching the
new techniques and setting a lower piece rate.  Even if individual firms and
workers wish to protect rates, the forces of competition overwhelm them. The
disputes in Lancashire were the outgrowth of these tensions.
Still, the lists were not scrapped and they survived into the inter-war years.
This implies that some formal or informal means of reward and punishment,
carrot and stick, was in place to enforce the lists and contain the ratchet effect.
Jewkes and Gray (ibid.) asserted it was due to "sanction and prestige."  This
was the case in Bolton where employers used external sanctions, like
blacklists, to penalize workers.  In Oldham, employers had the insight to
attach a profit-sharing scheme to the lists.  Profit sharing worked in Oldham
because it was based on a self-enforcing or an internal incentive structure.  To
develop the distinction between internal and external sanctions and their
implications, the next section draws on insights from the psychology literature
on shame and guilt.
Shame and Guilt
Economists have often invoked reputational effects as the mechanism
enforcing incomplete contracts like piece-rate payments.  Firms and workers
abide by their agreements because of the potential damage caused to their
reputations in finding new workers or jobs.  But this approach remains
unsatisfactory because reputation is an historically contingent phenomenon.
There is also an element of introspection lacking in this analysis.  Not all
societies or cultures care the same way about reputations, the classic example
being how Japanese and American business executives have reacted to laying
off workers.  While the Japanese manager has often felt that he has let down
his workers, the American executive has rewarded himself with pay increases.
Psychologists make the distinction between two types of emotional responses
in these situations: guilt and shame.5  These two emotions reveal different
person-environment relationships.  Guilt arises from internalized values about
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  My analysis of shame and guilt is based on Lazarus (1991, 240-47).  For treatments by
anthropologists, see Benedict (1946); for applications in law, see Kahan (1996).  See also Piers
and Singer (1971) for a critique.
5right and wrong (that is, what parents and society would like the person to be).
They are said to be based on prosocial feelings and empathic concern over the
distress of others, particularly those who share similar backgrounds or
concerns, like family members, neighbours or fellow workers, or what can be
referred to as horizontal attachments.  Guilt feelings are aroused when we
learn to acknowledge and understand the social significance of violations of
standards of conduct, the transgression of a moral imperative.  For our
purposes, workers are motivated to do well not so much by the direct pressure
of their peers, but by feelings internalized toward their comrades.  Thus, a
worker will not contribute to the ratchet effect by taking her ideas to a new
firm because doing so brings on bad feelings about what she is doing to
others.  
Shame is generated by a failure to live up to one’s ego identity (that is
discrepancies between what persons are and what they would like to be).
When we don’t live up to some ideal, we have disappointed the person,
usually a parent or parent-substitute at the source of the ego-ideal.  We would
not feel shame or humiliation if it were not for this external sanction or
approbation of the authority figure, a vertical attachment.  Sooner or later
through repeated action we become habituated to the threat of external
sanctions, and we act as if they are internalized.  This makes guilt and shame
difficult to distinguish, but the difference is that shame enforcement needs to
be resorted to at least occasionally to remind us of our relationship with our
authority figure.  For our purposes, it is the possibility of sanctions emanating
from the parent-substitute, the employer, that compels workers not to
contravene the piece-rate contract.
The contrast between guilt and shame is therefore not black and white, but it is
the proportions that are crucial in making sense of social relationships.  I
follow Lazear’s (1995) use of guilt and shame to clarify the implications of
different emotional responses for worker-worker and worker-firm
relationships, and how these two different responses contain the ratchet effect.
In guilt-based societies workers have strong feelings about their co-workers,
because if they let them down they would be breaking some moral imperative;
workers would avoid free riding (under performing or shirking) if this meant
hurting their co-workers.  But in shame-based societies, because of the ego-
ideal, the worker is in fact indifferent how they feel toward their colleagues or
their boss.  Thus, a worker who is not penalized in a shame-dominated culture
would engage in free riding whether or not this may hurt the owners of capital
or their fellow worker.
Consider an employer who pays a straight time-wage to his workers.  If a
worker in either a guilt or shame-based environment does not perform well,
6that is shirk, she will hurt the owners of capital.  To motivate workers, the
employer decides to introduce a profit-sharing scheme.  What prevents
workers from continuing to under perform (the free-rider effect)?  In shame-
based societies, where a worker is at best indifferent toward his fellow
workers, she might in fact continue to under produce, however she takes the
risk of being sanctioned by the employer, a gamble that might be worth taking.
Hence, there is little gain to profit share.  But in guilt-based communities,
there are potential gains because workers care more about their colleagues
than their bosses.  They work hard to avoid breaking the moral imperative of
not letting down their fellow workers.
Proponents of profit sharing (Kruse 1993) have observed its positive effect on
productivity and the stability of employment.  Profit sharing has the additional
virtue of containing the ratchet effect, because workers as investors would be
reluctant to take new technologies to competing firms.   In shame-based
environments, this alternative is not feasible since workers would take the new
technology elsewhere if they could.  They do not because external sanctions
are in place that make this behaviour costly.
Does the model mesh with the Lancashire experience?  Since shame and guilt
are not observed directly, I take the alternative approach and consider the
initial conditions in Bolton and Oldham and consider how shame and guilt-
based environments developed.  I then ask whether the types of enforcement
observed in the two towns are consistent with the initial conditions.
Bolton and Oldham: Paternalism and Confrontation
Beginning with the introduction of Crompton’s mule, Bolton grew rapidly as a
center of the fine-spinning trade in Lancashire.  Unlike in Manchester, where
there was a wide variety of work, firms in Bolton spun medium and high
counts of yarn almost exclusively.  With the expansion of fine spinning,
Bolton grew rapidly in the first decades of the century.  By 1811, the town had
33 mills that spun fine yarn, and the average mill had about 150 workers.  In
this expansion, as in later years, the family firm dominated (Honeyman 1982).
After 1825, markets stagnated, and factories in fine spinning added little new
capacity.  Still, as late as 1841 the average fine-spinning mill in Lancashire
employed approximately 200 workers and was nearly twice as large as the
average coarse-spinning establishment.
Disputes and strikes into the 1820s and later over the introduction of longer
spinning mules and piece rate cuts were not unknown.  Thompson (1968, 536)
wrote that from the late 1790s to 1820, "Bolton appears to have been the most
insurrectionary centre in England."  Thereafter, the bitterness that marked the
7early period of industrial relations dissipated.  From the 1840s on, according
to the most recent history of Bolton (Taylor 1995), paternalism became the
hallmark of worker-firm relations.6  "The vulnerability of labour to the
activities of innovating employers...played an important role in the greater
subordination of labour to capital after the Chartist period (ibid. 126)."
Employers’ concern for the welfare of their workers was manifested in factory
schools, libraries, housing, picnics and Christmas parties.  Employers hoped to
strengthen workers’ attachment to them, or, as one employer put it, "to cement
a feeling of...mutual interest" (ibid. 208).  The low rate of turnover of firms
and their large size gave mid-nineteenth century Bolton the appearance of a
hierarchical, almost manorial community in which workers and firms held
reciprocal obligations.  Even as early as the 1830s, a cotton spinner (cited in
Taylor 1995, 173) commented:
"[T]hough an artizan, not in the service of a master owes no
obedience[,] no sooner does he engage to exchange his labour with a
richer fellow, subject for some stipulated remuneration, then his
condition is changed; he then owes a reasonable obedience to his
employer, and the employer acquires a reasonable authority over his
servant."
In terms of the psychology literature reviewed above, workers’ ego-ideal had
become shaped and strengthened by their parent-substitute or employer.
Craft unionism appears to have flourished in this environment.  The Bolton
spinner’s union maintained its independence from employers.  Promotion was
based on seniority.  Bolton spinners hired, negotiated with and paid their own
piecers and nominated them for advancement (Savage 1987, 237); they were
also responsible for the maintenance and repair of their machines and
adjusting operating speeds (Bolin-Hort 1989, 158-61).  The role of
overlookers was quite limited.  Indeed, the popularity of Bolton style
paternalism was due in part to the fact that spinners could appeal directly to
their employers if overlookers had interfered too much in spinning operations.
The strong presence of unions on the shop floor would seem not to fit with
commonly held views about paternalism.  In weaving centres such as
Blackburn paternalism meant weak unions.  In the 1920s firms in the U.S.,
like Sears and Kodak, saw paternalism as an alternative to unionisation
(Jacoby 1997).  But in Bolton, from the 1840s until the turn of century,
spinners accepted the authority of employers, and in exchange craft unions
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  On the history of paternalism in Britain, see Rose (1990).  Joyce (1982) argued that
paternalism was a new initiative in industrial relations after 1850, but Taylor (1995) has stressed
its continuity.
8were able to protect their position on the mill floor.  Thus, workers’
preferences were divided between unions and bosses.
The spread of factory industry occurred later in Oldham than in Bolton,
although the two towns were no more than fifty miles apart.   Until 1850 or so,
many Oldham firms rented or shared space and power in a larger mill.  The
’room and turning system’ maintained the small firm as the typical unit of
production.  The system, according to Farnie (1979, 246), "accentuated the
degree of competition, and increased the mortality rate among factory
masters," and again in contrast with Bolton, prevented "the family firm from
establishing an hereditary monopoly of local industry under a separate caste of
employers."  As late as 1841, the average coarse mill employed only 100
workers.  Breaking with the ownership tradition of Lancashire towns, Oldham
became known as "the pariah of the cotton trade," or a "frontier town (ibid.
45)."  "Whether or not Oldham was rough," Joyce (1991, 30) wrote, "it was
certainly vulgar."  From the outset the town specialized in coarse spinning,
which did not add to its reputation.  "The refuse from all the other Lancashire
towns is brought to [Oldham], and worked up into the coarsest and trashiest
fabrics (Farnie 1982, 44)."  Faced by competitive pressures, employers
introduced new technologies, like the self-acting mule, and slashed piece rates.
In response a core group of Oldham workers, including cotton spinners,
machine-builders and miners, organized to defend their social and industrial
position.  The mantle of radicalism had passed from Bolton to Oldham.
Although Foster’s (1974) account of the development of "revolutionary class
consciousness" in the town remains controversial, recent historians have not
dismissed entirely the town’s exceptional radical bent.7  Oldham’s workers did
show comparatively a greater degree of cohesion that was revealed in
recurrent confrontations with employers both on the factory floor and in the
political arena, and by the second quarter of the century, it was probably the
most radical centre in Lancashire (Joyce 1980, 161).  Whereas in Bolton it
appears that the working-class leaders moved freely into liberalism, in Oldham
liberals and radicals held separate and often competing positions with regard
to changes in the Poor Law, the abolition of the Corn Laws and the Reform
Bill.  The Oldham radical position represented a shared or common belief in
an alternative model to the factory, while in Bolton such visions like Owenism
had limited appeal.  Gadian (1996, 279) observed: "Oldham’s high level of
political mobilization meant that the beliefs of the mass of the population were
particularly crucial...[and] radicalism’s strength had been based upon its ability
to give expression to the views of the operative and non-elector."
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  The standard critique of Foster is Stedman Jones  (1983).  For other contributions to the
debate, see Gadian (1978, 1996), Sykes (1980), and Winstanley (1993).
9By 1850 or so, the context of social relationships was well defined in Bolton
and Oldham.  Paternalist or vertical arrangements characterized Bolton to the
extent that workers believed that their interests were served as well by their
employers as by independent working-class organisations.  Thus, an individual
Bolton worker could be said to indifferent as to the sort of his employer or
fellow worker.  This established the need for shame-based enforcement of
piece rates.  In Oldham, because of strong horizontal attachments, workers
saw that their interests were distinct from those of their employers.  Their
shared experience of confrontation set the foundation for guilt-based
enforcement.
The Oldham Limiteds
Consistent with its tradition of a strong worker culture, the 1850s in Oldham
saw the expansion of friendly and building societies, sick and funeral clubs,
and above all, of cooperative stores.  Oldham became a cooperative centre
second in importance only to Rochdale.  These societies, along with the Joint
Stock Acts of 1855-56, laid the foundation for the popularity of limited
liability companies.  The pioneer company, the Oldham Building and
Manufacturing Co. Ltd., was formed by skilled workers who sought to gain
through cooperation a greater equality of income and wealth.  The Oldham
Building Co. later became the Sun Mill Co. Ltd, which soon evolved into the
largest mill in the district, paying an annual average dividend of 12 1/3
percent.8  Workers involvement as investors at Sun Mill was limited, but they
did gain experience as managers, purchasers of raw cotton and sellers of yarn.
Motivated by the high dividends paid by the Sun Mill, and the example of
cooperatives during the Paris Commune, workers played a more active
investing role during the first wave of expansion of the limiteds between 1870
and 1873, and the subsequent wave of 1873-75.  When the boom ended a
hundred companies had been created.  Many of the new companies were
conversions of failing private concerns.  There were two other booms, 1883-
84 and 1889-90.   In all, from 1858-96, Oldham formed 154 limiteds, or more
than twice as much as found in Bolton (Farnie 1979, 250-51).  The only other
part of the textile industry where the limited company had the same hold as in
Oldham was the Irish linen trade (Cottrell 1980, 105).
To eliminate free riding completely and get the full gains of profit sharing,
membership in the plans would have had to been universal.  Although
membership was voluntary in Oldham, by about 1875 or so, about 75 percent
of the working class held shares in the limiteds, or about 20 percent of the
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  On the history of Sun Mill, see Smith (1961) and Tyson (1962).
10
town’s population (Farnie 1979, 250).  Companies’ capital consisted of loan
finance as well as equity subscriptions, generally in equal proportions.
(Cottrell 1980, 110).  Unfortunately, few statistics of the actual amounts held
by workers have survived, but appears that loan accounts were favored by the
uninitiated.  Companies generally issued loan shares of £5 denomination
which amounted to roughly three weeks' pay for the average cotton spinner
(30-35s per week).  Workers made investments in their own mill, but also in
competing mills to diversify their risk.  Their returns varied considerably,
from 5 to 20 percent by some accounts in the 1870s, but always more that
could be earned at a local savings bank which paid 2 3/4 percent.  The 5
percent was fixed by custom and did not vary with the condition of the money
market.  With the expansion of profit sharing schemes in the 1870s, Oldham
had transformed itself from a "frontier" or "radical" town into "Diviborough,"
in which, to borrow Gladstone's (cited in Farnie 1979, 248),  phrase, the
working class had become "an association of small capitalists employing other
work people."
The expansion of the limiteds coincided with changes in industrial relations.
Lazear (1995, 49) noted the importance to employers of investing in
arrangements that created bonds among workers in order to arouse latent guilt-
based emotions.  In Oldham, this investment took the form of changes to the
1872 list.  Recall that the original 1872 list made no adjustment for the speed
of machinery, and because of the nature of the list - it fixed workers' earnings -
employers gained all the benefits of additional speed-up.  When the original
three year agreement expired, a general strike ensued during which spinners
threatened to sell their shares in the limiteds.  The dispute of six weeks ended
when employers conceded a speed clause, an allowance which attributed to
operatives half of the increased production.  Together with other changes, this
meant that their was an immediate gain of 6.5 percent for the spinners (Fowler
and Wyke 1987, 73).
In principle, the combination of profit sharing and changes in 1875 to the list
would have contained the ratchet effect.  The speed clause gave workers as
wage earners some of the benefits of the new technologies; and workers as
investors would have been reluctant to take these new techniques to competing
firms.  This constraint was loosened by workers investing elsewhere, and the
rivalry between public and private enterprises.  As a result, the revised list
supplemented by profit sharing did not put an end to the ratchet effect, and
competitive pressures forced employers to make adjustments to wage rates
(beyond negotiated cyclical changes) and to reduce costs by using inferior
types of raw cotton. There were innumerable stoppages in Oldham, especially
after the mid-1870s boom.
11
Having said this, the evidence suggests that profit sharing and the speed clause
did succeed in raising productivity and earnings as expected in a guilt-based
environment.  For each of the three decades between 1876-77 and 1906-07,
Lazonick (1990, 162-63) estimated increases in the average number of
spindles per mule of 11.5, 4.6 and 12.1 percent, and increases in mule speeds
of 6.2, 4.4 and 4.7 percent.  Labour productivity is more difficult to measure,
because of changes in raw cotton and in the quality of outputs, but a lower
bound estimate is that average annual output per operative in coarse spinning
grew by about 2.5 percent per annum from 1870 to 1896; in fine spinning it
was less than 2 percent (ibid.).  As for earnings, Oldham spinners’ wages
(excluding dividend earnings) increased from 27s 10d in 1860 to 40s per week
in 1900; in Bolton the increase was more modest, from 34s to 40s in the same
period (Wood 1910).
Ellison (1886, 138), a contemporary historian of the industry, saw a clear
connection between the rise in efficiency and profit sharing:
The daily discussions which take place amongst the shareholders as to
why dividends are small or otherwise have led almost every intelligent
operative to become more economical with materials, more
industrious, and to see what effect his individual [my emphasis] efforts
have upon the cost of the materials produced.  In fact, the bulk of the
working class operatives of Oldham have more knowledge of the
buying of cotton, working it up, and selling the manufactured goods
than most private employers had ten years ago.
Shareholders, whether workers, merchants or widows, were quite severe with
managers who did not perform well.  True to their cooperative nature, and the
radical egalitarian tradition of the town, limiteds were governed on the
principle of ’one man one vote.’  This form of company governance was
unique in Great Britain.  Shareholders, Farnie (1979, 266) observed, proved to
be the "strictest of economists and were prepared to oust a whole board,
displaying as much ruthlessness as...the leaders of the French Revolution
towards their unsuccessful generals."  Following these guidelines, free riding
must have been strongly discouraged.
Along with increased productivity, advocates (Kruse 1993) of profit sharing
make the claim that, compared to a pure wage system, employment is less
variable when earnings are tied to some profit indicator or output price.  Trade
union numbers for the period give some indirect evidence in support of this
view.9  Between 1870 and 1890, membership declined in four years in the
                                                
9
  The limiteds were very reluctant to work short-time and this contributed to employment
stability in Oldham.
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Oldham province; eight years in the Bolton province (Fowler and Wyke 1987,
242).   Conversely, relative employment stability led to greater variability in
wage rates, and for the period after 1850, the Oldham wage list was adjusted
more frequently than that of Bolton (Huberman 1996, 146).  However, given
the combined effect of a steady stream of dividend earnings and the stability
of their employment, Oldham spinners could more easily absorb these wage
adjustments than spinners elsewhere.  As Farnie (1979, 265) concluded, into
the late 1870s, Oldham spinners enjoyed a prosperity absent elsewhere in
Lancashire.
Bolton: Tried and True Industrial Relations
In Bolton, the family firm remained the typical unit of production.  The town’s
cooperative tradition was weaker than Oldham’s and, in the absence of strong
worker attachments, profit-sharing schemes were not viable.  There was little
interest in public companies, except in insurance (Joyce 1980, 24).  In textiles,
employers preferred the tried and true management techniques that had been
developed since the 1840s.  Indeed paternalism’s hold appears to have been
extended.   Writing at the end of the century, the Bolton operative and
journalist Allen Clarke (cited in Joyce 1980, 90) echoed the sentiments of the
1830’s cotton spinner cited earlier:  Workers "think that the masters build
factories and workshops not to make a living for themselves by trading but in
order to find the people employment.  They honestly believe that if there were
no mills and workshops the poor people would all perish."
Craft unionism was the other cornerstone of the Bolton model of industrial
relations and, like paternalism, it too appears to have been reinforced after mid
century.  Consider the trend throughout Lancashire to replace the traditional
spinner-piecer work unit, the basis of the craft system, with two joiner-
minders, each with joint responsibility for spinning operations.  Whereas in
the former system, the spinner earned more than double his junior worker,
wages of joiner-minders were equal, each earning somewhat less than a
spinner.  It would have been expected that joiner-minding would be more
common in regions such as Bolton, where few alternative employment
openings for older piecers, gave employers a decided advantage in bargaining.
But contrary to expectations, Bolton’s operatives’ union was the most
successful association in Lancashire in defending the craft system.  It was in
13
Oldham where the union allowed joiner-minding at a certain proportion of
mules in each mill (Bolin-Hort 1989, 159-60).10
Bolton workers were thus caught between competing loyalties: unions and
employers.  As a result, profit sharing or similar incentive programs that were
based on a strong worker culture would have been inappropriate vehicle to
contain the ratchet effect.  Firms and workers maintained the initial piece rate
lists without major changes to it, like speed clauses, and they opted for
traditional methods of enforcement or supervision of the lists, such as
blacklists and letters of discharge.  Although not unknown in Oldham, external
sanctions of this type became the dominant enforcement mechanism in Bolton.
The fear of ostracism and social censure provoked shame-based emotions and
compelled individuals to abide by some norm of behavior.  Moreover, since
testaments were written they had the force of law.  If these sanctions were not
in place, individuals would have behaved otherwise.  
There were two types of blacklists used before 1850.  Worker sponsored
blacklists identified mill-owners, usually rural or small mills, who refused to
pay by the negotiated regional list, cut wages arbitrarily or who had reneged
on a promised wage increase.  Workers would also name colleagues who
accepted employment at lower than standard wages.  The names were most
often published in worker or trade union newspapers.11  It was not uncommon
for owners of large mills in Bolton using the most advanced technologies to
give their support to workers wishing to protect the regional wage list and curb
wage ratcheting at smaller mills; these testimonials appeared in the local press
as well.12  At other times, newspaper columns mentioned employers who had
broken a wage commitment to their workers or an agreement concerning
short-time.13  The second type of blacklist was employer sponsored.
Employers would identify names of recalcitrant or refractory spinners who had
initiated strikes or walkouts.  A dismissed spinner could not find employment
elsewhere, unless he produced a discharge note from his former employer
attesting to his character.14  Enforcement by sanctions contained the ratchet
effect because it required the support of unions operating within a strong
                                                
10
  The ability of Bolton piecers to maintain their wages (despite a surplus of young workers) is
another  indication of the strength of the Bolton craft system.  In Oldham, where there was a
stronger demand for young workers, piecers’ wages were lower.
11
  For example, Voice of the People 24 Feb. 1831.
12
  Bolton Chronicle 29 Oct. 1836.
13
  Manchester Guardian 13 Oct. 1847; Ten Hours Advocate 13 Mar. 1847.
14
  On the history of discharge note or letter, see McIvor (1996, 39).  Employers appeared to have
the upper hand in the use of blacklists. Union blacklisting and boycotting of underpaying ’unfair’
employers was declared an illegal conspiracy in 1875, but as late as the 1890s employer
blacklisting was declared legal on the grounds that this was done in order "to defeat and to
counter-act the purposes of the men’s unions  (ibid. 105-06)."
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paternalist work relationship.  Indeed, sanctions seem to have strengthened
craft unionism and paternalism.  Because Bolton workers ostracized
colleagues who accepted lower wages elsewhere, workers’ cohesion was less
evident than in Oldham and paternalism was therefore reinforced.  Because
firms stigmatized individuals workers, craft unions had to better monitor their
members, which in turn strengthened the importance of the union as the
representative agent of collective bargaining.  If the stability of industrial
relations after mid century is any indication, paternalism and unions worked
well together in enforcing the lists.  By the end of the nineteenth century the
only real threat to unleashing the ratchet effect came from outside the system
itself.  Both employers and workers agreed that it was the limiteds of the
Oldham type that posed the greatest danger to the Bolton system.
Conclusion: Lancashire on the Couch
The success of the Oldham limiteds was such that coarse spinning became the
growth engine of the industry.  Between 1866 and 1884, Oldham added 6.6
million spindles, or 81 percent of the total increment made by the whole of the
British cotton trade; its share of capacity rose from 9 percent in 1866 to 24
percent in 1884.  In 1891, when Oldham reached the summit of its relative
importance in the world, it mustered one-sixth of the spindles of Europe and
one-eighth of the spindles of the world (Farnie 1982, 41).  The ability of the
limiteds in raising loans through profit sharing was in part responsible for this
rapid expansion.  Why did other sectors in the industry not follow this trend?
How did two models of enforcement coexist?
The answer lies in the methods of enforcement themselves.  Shame and guilt-
based enforcement had their origins in the different worker-worker and
worker-firm relationships in Bolton and Oldham.  As written testaments in
Bolton evolved into the standard means of punishing rate busters, institutions
and codes of behavior developed around the means of enforcement that further
encouraged the parties to exploit emotions of shame.  It was in everyone’s
interest to defend and retain the local method of enforcement.  The combined
pressure of employers (paternalism) and workers (craft unionism) prevented
the intrusion of the limiteds.  In many ways, Bolton did not suffer.  Investment
in fine spinning continued and there was steady improvement in productivity,
although not at the pace seen in Oldham.    
As for Oldham, and the cotton-spinning industry in general, they were victims
of their own success.  Because of the initial success of profit sharing and the
competitive advantage of limiteds compared to private concerns, internal
sanctions based on guilt emotions became the standard means of enforcement
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in the coarse spinning region.  Once profit sharing was in place, it was difficult
to go back.  It did, however, change its nature.  To finance the steady flow of
dividends, the limiteds were forced on occasion to disinvest their profits.
Thoms (1998, 6) has recently shown that the slump of the 1890s ended the
system of the "democratic limiteds."  He (1994) found a rising trend in the
return to capital from 1886 to 1910, but that the growth of fixed capital
investment did not keep pace.  Existing companies through generous dividend
policies allowed capitalisation to "whither."  Recognizing the sector’s
emphasis on maintaining dividend payments, workers from the 1880s on
began drawing down their portion of outstanding loans.  The sector had turned
from a desire in the 1870s to invest in new plant and equipment to short-term
concerns in the 1890s about financial solvency.
Thus, different enforcement mechanisms in two sectors of the industry
coexisted, with a noticeable gap between the performance of coarse and fine
spinning.  Although this is not the place to rehearse the heated debate about
the decline of Lancashire, the limiteds and profit sharing contained the ratchet
effect, but also created incentives to finance coarse at the expense of fine
spinning.  The relation between enforcement mechanisms and sectoral growth
needs be considered further in explaining why the industry found itself
competing with low-wage producers of coarse yarn and goods, like Japan and
India.  If this relation stands up to further research, then Lancashire can be
said to have suffered from too much guilt and not enough shame.
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